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Introduction 
 
 
At the start of 2001, French unions and employers began negotiations on continuing 
vocational training. These negotiations, launched by Medef (the main employers' 
organisation), were part of a more wide-ranging project to reorganise labour relations with, as 
Medef's objective, a view to changing the overall framework of industrial relations. Other 
themes had been discussed over the previous two years, including reforming unemployment 
benefits and how to structure different levels of negotiations. After ten months of discussions 
on continuing education, the negotiations broke down. Nevertheless, there was a consensus on 
many of the ideas raised.  In 2003, a new round of negotiation began. It ended with a general 
agreement between all the partners – an exception in the French industrial relations system- 
that has been translated in the labour law.  The change in the FVET system is said to be a step 
towards lifelong learning. 
 
However, lifelong learning is more a slogan than a reality. In France, as in most of the OECD 
countries, the national expenditure for further education and training (FVET) has decreased 
since 1995. And the basic roots of a lifelong learning policy remain unclear. 
- The debate about the Knowledge society shows two tendencies. A part of the literature 
promotes a narrow conception of knowledge (scientific and technical), mainly devoted 
to economic production and claims for more commodification of knowledge. Other 
part put the emphasis on a wider conception (including social knowledge, “citizen” 
knowledge…) and fights again the market of knowledge (Méhaut, 2004) 
- As in other fields of the welfare policies, FVET policies are in tone between risk 
(FVET as an insurance for employability) and personal development (FVET as a tool 
for a career) (Ramaux, 2003). 
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The 2003 and 2004 reforms could be analysed as double compromise: between risk and 
welfare on the one hand, between individual insurance and collective rights over resources on 
the other hand.  
 
This double compromise will be the red file of the paper. In a first section, we analyse the 
main debates about the reform of the welfare state, applied to labour market policies. The 
second section analyses the reform of the FVET system, and tries to locate the new devices 
between risk and welfare, insurance and social rights.       
 
 
 
I. Risks, employment risks or social rights? 
 
Risk was a key concept for the welfare policies in France (for example, for the protection 
against industrial accidents). Risk is also used, in a broader and sometimes misunderstood 
meaning, to name other fields of the social protection, such as “family risks” (allowance for 
children) or “retirement risk”. In both cases, this broader use is due to the fact that retirement 
(or birth) could decrease the household income and that social insurance (with employer and 
individual mandatory contributions). In the field of employment and labour market, risk was 
used in terms of industrial accidents, occupational diseases, as well as in terms of 
unemployment. But more and more, “risk” names any kind of employment situation (unstable 
employment, risk for employability, skill obsolescence…). However, very different 
propositions are made about the links between risks and the reform of the welfare state.      
 
I.1. Beck, Ewald, and Kessler: the risk society? 
 
Beck was late translated into French (Beck, 2001). But, as well as Giddens proposals, “the 
risk society” is very similar to the analysis and proposals of the neo-liberal and employer 
organisations’ analysts. Ewald and Kessler (2000) and Kessler (2000) who were the 
instigators of the employers’ organisation (Medef) for the “refondation sociale” negotiations 
(aiming at a huge change within French industrial relation system) spoke about the increase of 
risks within the modern society. Like Beck, they defined risks in an extensive way: major 
collective risks (environmental risks, new diseases…), classical “social risks” (industrial 
accidents, retirements…), and new risks (unemployment, exclusion…). Risks not only change 
in their extension but also in their frequency (for example unemployment). They also put 
forward the hypothesis that individuals have a growing perception of the risks, and that new 
behaviours could be forecasted, more preventive and using more individual insurances. These 
new behaviours are a necessity. The risks are not exogenous to the individual but are 
produced by himself: not taking into account health increase the predictable risk of disease 
and justify private insurance. According to Ewald and Kessler, in the field of employment, the 
same trends are obvious. Unemployment is mainly due to individual’s behaviours; 
employability is an individual attribute and will depend upon the individual initiative, fighting 
against skills’ obsolescence. 
The imputability of the risk will then lead to a clearer share of the burden between the 
individual and the social and collective welfare systems. It is only on this topic that Ewald and 
Kessler differ from Beck.  Beck put the emphasis on the growing difficulty to impute to 
somebody the more diffuse and unclear responsibility of risks. 
   
With this analysis, Kessler (2000) suggested: 
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- a change of the welfare State, which was built on “old” risks and not on the new ones; 
- a weakening of the role of the family as a safety net against new risks 
- an increasing role of the market (private insurance, capital saving) which is now able 
to offer a safer protection against risks. 
The “refondation sociale” of the welfare system will then be built up on: 
 
- a “competitiveness” rule ( and in the same text, as a kind of slip of the tong, he also 
use compatibility) : in a global world, the costs and returns of the welfare systems 
must be compatible with what is done in other countries ; 
- an efficiency rule ; 
- a fairness rule (lower level of transfer between social groups and clearer rules when 
transfers occur ) ; 
- a rule of responsibility: any right is linked to duties, their will be incentives for the 
best and prudent behaviours, you get a return according to your contribution. 
            
We will later see that some of these proposals were also at the start of the negotiation 
regarding FVET, on the employer side. However, we must first discuss the reality of the new 
risks in the field of employment.  
  
 
I.2. New risks within the employment field?  
 
In the recent literature about employment risks, three types of analysis prevail. 
 
I.2.1 A remaining high level of employment stability? 
 
Like Auer or Lendhorf, some recent papers put the emphasis on the question of employment 
stability. The common thesis of a growing instability is challenged. Based on the employment 
survey from 1969 to 2002, L’horty (2004) shows that there was not a strong increase of 
instability (instability is defined as the risk to quit employment from one year to another, 
either for unemployment or inactivity). The 2002 level is close to the 1969 one. As shown in 
table 1, there were some fluctuations along the period.  
 
(table 1) 
 
Analysing in deeper details the risks, he splits data according to industry-level, job tenure, age 
and skills, labour market experience… : 
- According to the age, there was a higher risk for the >50 at the start of the period, but 
a decreasing risk now; 
- There is a low level of risk (and very little changes) for the 30-50; 
- Job tenure (more than 5 years) remains a good protection; 
- And the higher skilled employees are those with the lowest level of instability; 
 
When combining all the variables, he concludes both on a stable level of risk and on a change 
of its distribution between various groups of employees. 
 
With other goals and methods, but based on similar data, Bodighel (2003) analyses the role of 
job tenure. He shows that job tenure is stable (and even increasing slightly) over the past 30 
years. Job tenure is the best protection against unemployment for the 30-50 years old, but its 
power is decreasing for the young and for the > 50. 
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One can conclude about the remaining power of internal labour markets (or of implicit 
contracts, like Bodighel). 
 
However, these analysis: 
- Use yearly panel data; they cannot analyse quicker job rotation within the year, and do 
not grasp the risk in a biographic perspective. 
- Do not give a clear picture of the risk diffusion: a general diffusion or a renewal of 
labour market segmentation? Young new comers on the labour market are clearly 
facing a high level of risk (for more than 2/3 of them) (Céreq, 2001) and they are 
sometimes said to be experimenting the new general labour market rules. But the 
surveys also provided evidence of a process of stabilisation: after 3 years on the labour 
market, 80% of a cohort is in stable employment. 
- Do not allow taking into account the real effect of inactivity or unemployment on the 
individual or households. There is no gender analysis. And, as a matter of fact, if 
inactivity spells were more common for the women in the 70’s when they had 
children, it did not have the same impact on the households’ earnings. The family 
structure was a stable and « breadwinner » one. It is clear now that inactivity has 
another meaning and other consequences in single households and/or for women with 
a stronger commitment to wage earning activity than before. 
- Do not allow to grasp the growing feeling of labour market insecurity which is shown 
for most of the individuals (Cerc, 2002), feeling that resembles what Beck said about 
the « risk society »; 
- And putting the emphasis on transitions from employment to unemployment or 
inactivity, they do not allow to take into account the within employment transitions. 
 
 
1.2.2 Transitional labour markets?  
 
 
A second set of papers is inspired by the transitional labour markets analysis. But they do not 
put the emphasis on the same transitions, and do not have the same consequences on labour 
market policies. 
 
Following Schmidt (in Schömann, 2003) and Shömann (2003), some analyses are promoting 
a new conception of labour market policies and of social policies. In a first step, analyses also 
started from increasing risks of transitions between employment and non-employment, and 
more broadly between employment and other social status. The question is to provide more 
security to the transitions, combining private and public policies and devices, able to 
anticipate the risk. They put the emphasis only on the « risky » transitions, and lead to rather 
classical suggestions about policies. The main (important) change would be to shift from 
passive to active policies, anticipating the risk and giving the individuals a stronger safety net 
along the lifetime. But tools are classical: a share of the burden between the individuals, the 
employers and the public bodies, new policies aiming to overcome the segmentation between 
status (policies focusing on the individual whatever is its present or past situation) and 
promoting the right over resources in a preventive way. One can say that they share the liberal 
hypothesis of the risk society, but promote a non-liberal « third » way policy, outside of the 
core of the employment relationship. 
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In a broader meaning, but also inspired by TLM theory, Gazier (2003) put the emphasis on all 
the transitions: between employment positions, between employment and unemployment, but 
also within employment and between all the situations combining employment and other 
social and mixed positions (educational leave, parental leave, other social activities in unions, 
associations…). The proposals put the emphasis on a more global conception of the individual 
development and welfare, inside and outside of the productive sphere. Social policies are 
more oriented towards individual and collective welfare. The hypothesis is that this new 
welfare will increase individual productivity and labour market efficiency. They are not only 
a way to build a new protection against risks. And they are close to the conception of the new 
individual in a knowledge society, developing its productive ability within as well as outside 
the job. 
 
Some labour law specialists also promote similar proposals. 
 
1.2.3 A new share of the risks or a new labour market status? 
 
This third type of literature put the emphasis on the changes of the employment relationship. 
The French labour laws were built with the hypothesis of an asymmetrical relationship 
between the employer and the employee. The labour contract could not be regarded as a 
commercial one. The wage relationship on the one hand and the authority of the employer 
over the wage earner during the wage contract are the two pillars of the labour laws. But this 
was mainly for the case of typical employment relationship, with a stable contract and clear 
roles of employers and employees. If they share the hypothesis of a growing employment risk 
(Morin 2001), the new labour law analyses try to take into account the global change of the 
employment contract: they study not only the precarious employment, the risk of quitting, but 
also the change within the standard employment relation (the role of the new human resource 
management), as well as the merging of new forms of distribution of the power, which are not 
pure direct wage relationship (in the case of subcontracting, for workers directly selling their 
services…).           
   
The table below provides a good example of this kind of research (Morin 2002, Morin Dupuy 
Larré, 1999, Dupuy Larré, 1999).  
 
Horizontally, the authors examine the share of power within the work (organisation).  
Organisation symbolises the way the tasks are distributed, the span of control of the individual 
on his own job. 
Vertically, they examine the share of risk (wage and employment risks). Risk (wage and/or 
employment) depends on the nature of the contract (under labour law or not, or moving from 
the standard to atypical employment relationship). 
 
 
 RISK 
 Individual Mixed 
 
Collective 
Individual 1 4 7 
Mixed 2 5 8 
ORGANISATION 
Collective 3 6 9 
Source : Dupuy, Larré, 1999   
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As an example, cell n°1 could define the situation of a self-employed individual in handicraft 
activities. He organises all his productive activity by himself, bares the uncertainty of the 
production process and of its result, and directly bares the economical risk (work, income and 
employment risk). Cell N° 9 shows the opposite situation for the “fordist” wage earner in a 
big firm: low span of control on his job and tasks, and risks are collectively ruled and shared.  
 
The other cells show intermediary situations (all existing today in France). Cells 3,5,6,8 and 7 
could be regarded as atypical wage earning relationships: cell 8 where the employee has a 
high level of autonomy within his job but remains in a classical risk relation (case for working 
at home), cell 3 with a high level of organisational dependence but with a lot of risk (in some 
trade activities). Cell 6 could represent the case where, in classical organisations, a part of the 
wage now depends on the result.  
 
Cell 5 shows the trend which characterises the new labour organisations and management: a 
growing autonomy within the job, but more risk on the wage and employment side (see for 
example the question of competencies based management, Mehaut 2004). 
 
Here, the question of risk is not only outside the employment relation but also inside. And 
employment (wage) risk is the other side of the changing organisational patterns also allowing 
the individual to more autonomy and sometimes more choices. 
 
Examining the same question and the evolution of the labour laws, Supiot (1999) shows the 
tensions within the labour law contract and the welfare system. He advocates for a new status 
(labour market status) able to cover all the individuals (whatever the cell they are in) and 
aiming to protect him whatever is, or will be, their situation along the lifetime. The “labour 
market status” will not be based on the employment situation at a time period, but on the 
individual global belonging to the labour market and society. The status will not only provide 
a safety net within the employment relationship, but also facilitate other activities contributing 
to the individual and social well-being and reproduction: education and training in a lifelong 
perspective, household work with a free choice for men and women, other kind of social 
activities (in associations, international aid…). These new kind of social rights will be partly 
based on the individual productive contribution. But they also could be provided by other 
actors (state, regional or local authorities). They will unify the previously segmented devices, 
and be attached to the individual all his life. But the proposal is very different from the neo-
liberal position: it does not promote a minimum public welfare (poor assistance). And it is not 
an insurance against risks, as the use of the rights is left to the individuals, even before a risky 
situation. The new social rights will be ruled by collective regulations (law and collective 
bargaining), they will be acquired progressively through any kind of productive activity (short 
term or long term employment situation, independent work…). Part will be allowed by the 
state (educational provisions). And they will be used freely along the lifetime.              
 
  
 
 
II The on-going reform of the FVET system: an analysis between risks and 
transitions 
 
Coming back now to the reform of the FVET system, we will try to provide a comprehensive 
analysis, showing how various influences are exerted on the employers organisations as well 
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as on the unions, and what kind of compromises have been made during the negotiation. In 
further steps of the research, we will follow the negotiation at the industry and firm level, and 
use a similar grid. As the process of the reform is at the beginning, it is not an evaluation of its 
results.     
II.1 Continuing education within the overall context of "reorganising labour 
relations"(refondation sociale), an overview of the agreement and law 
The negotiations upon FVET were launched at the employers' initiative as part of a much 
broader project for what the Medef calls "reorganising labour relations". In the face of a 
leftwing government, the employers' organisation was seeking to regain control of labour 
related issues, an area where state intervention is frequent. By launching various negotiations 
on topics such as unemployment insurance, wealth at work, the hierarchy of norms, and 
vocational training, the Medef's ambition was to transform the framework of labour relations 
in France by empowering unions and employers (including via "minority" agreements i.e. 
signed by only a fraction of employees' unions), defining new negotiation practices 
(reinforcing the company's role and diminishing that of industry-wide agreements…), whilst 
advocating a more liberal and less regulated approach to the labour market.  
From the very start, this general framework overshadowed the 2001-2003 vocational training 
negotiations, and they began after a major conflict over unemployment insurance. The Medef 
and certain trade unions had agreed to reform unemployment benefits, which would become 
conditional upon the job seeker's individual, contractual agreement to actively seek 
employment. The CGT and FO were opposed to this agreement, which would later give rise 
to a conflict with the government over its application. But the negotiations also began in the 
aftermath of legislation on the 35-hour working week, which necessarily involved 
determining what constituted actual time worked. Conflict emerged over how training time 
should be treated, with certain industries seeking to exclude it as much as possible from actual 
time worked.  
Although it is entitled "agreement on employee’s access to life long learning", the document 
in fact contained a set of proposals going beyond just training issues and aimed at quite 
radically transforming the approach. It covered all issues related to career development and 
employee mobility, training being just one of many tools and not an end in itself.  
The themes covered can be grouped into four chapters (although they are not in this order in 
the draft agreement). 
II.1.2 Training as means of career development 
Noting changes underway both in work organisation and in mobility, the text emphasises the 
need for employee career development both within and outside their present company. In this 
respect, the very first article stresses the need to put together a career plan. This career plan, 
which may be discussed with the employer, must be accompanied by a skills assessment and 
by career guidance.  
It may also involve the validation of prior vocational skills and experience. A law was passed 
in 2001 in order to foster and enlarge validation of prior experience. All public vocational 
certificates, and also private or industry based certificates if they want to be taken into 
account in the “national repertory of certifications and diplomas”, have to be delivered not 
only after attending a course, but also by the way of validation of experience. The individual 
can claim for such a validation (for the complete diploma, or for some part), giving the proof 
of knowledge and competencies acquired in work experience or in other social activities 
(association, elective duty…). Social partners agree to promote the validation, and to define, 
later, a national inter-industry framework of certificates.      
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An “education and training passport” will be created, and used at the individual’s choice. The 
passport will summarize education and training activities (initial and further, with or without 
certification) as well as the work experience and competencies. It could take into account 
European Union suggestions and could be used in case of internal or external mobility.     
Training then becomes just one of many means of implementing a career plan. Whilst a rather 
restrictive interpretation of training prevailed in the 1971 legislation (training interpreted 
mainly as training courses, in a formal situation where knowledge is transmitted), a much 
wider concept was proposed, ranging from training in the workplace to different forms of self-
study, with or without the use of new information and communication technologies.  
II.1.2 Tentative steps towards modifying structural inequality  
Various other measures tackled with the problem of unequal access to training. It was on this 
point that the 2001 agreement was the most cautious, and at times contradictory, and in the 
unions' viewpoint accomplished the least.  The 2003 agreement goes a step further.  
As regards very small companies (less than 10 employees), the agreement will tripled their 
compulsory training contributions (from 0.15 to 0.45% of the total wage bill), in line with the 
thinking behind the 1971 legislation. This measure reflects a will to develop training in small 
companies where an increasing number of employees are concentrated, and shows the global 
consensus between the partners to keep and develop the French style of compulsory training 
levy (for bigger firms, the level of the compulsory contribution increases from 1.5 to 1.6% of 
the wage bill).  
The agreement also provided for more targeted efforts in favour of employees on fixed term 
contracts and for those working in temporary job agencies.  
It called upon each industry to make a particular effort towards priority groups (in particular 
the unskilled), to be designated during industry-wide negotiations and develop specific 
recommendations on gender equality. 
The agreement also reorganised the various employment and training contracts existing 
before. On the one hand, it created a “contract for professionnalisation”, targeting the young 
unemployed and the other unemployed peoples. The contract provided a fixed term (or not) 
labour contract, including education and training period within or out of the job. The wage 
will be a percentage of the minimum wage. At the end of the contract, if opportunities of 
employment are not provided within the firm, the social actors at the level of the industry or at 
a local level must organise offers in other firms. On the other hand, the agreement proposed a 
new device called “period of professionnalisation”. This new device targets employees with 
high level of risk for their job, due to a rapid technological change and/or to skill 
obsolescence. Organised as “sandwich periods” (with education and training), they must 
provide a skill certificate (public or private credential) and could include a validation of prior 
job experience. 50-year-old employees, or those with more than 20 years of tenure could 
claim for it. We are clearly here in logic of “risk”, as the period is explicitly said to aim at 
preventing firing and/or unemployment. The framework, targets and credentials, will be 
defined at the industry-level. And the costs are shared through an “insurance” principle, 
provided by the group training funds (but the insurance is for the firm, not for the 
individuals).      
 
II.1.3 Creating new opportunities for the individual 
The measures above were also part of a will to develop individual training initiatives on the 
part of employees and to create a third way of gaining access to continuing education. This 
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would be half way between the training plan (solely at the employer's initiative, aimed at 
adapting the employee to the job) and personal training leave (in existence since 1971, where 
the employee is free to choose but which is most often used for long-term training courses, 
and relatively rarely used - approximately 20 000 personal training leaves are taken each 
year).  
Inspired by the education accounts already developed by some Scandinavian companies, the 
2001 agreement instated the principle of a concerted development plan. In each company and 
after collective agreement, education accounts could be created. Each employee would "pay 
in" to their individual account, for example by "paying in" overtime, extra time resulting from 
the shorter working week, or part of future pay increases or leave entitlements. The individual 
holder of each account (managed in cash by the company) could then approach the employer 
to discuss a training project (for career development). When an agreement is reached, the 
employer would contribute the equivalent of whatever the employee had already "paid in" to 
the account. These sums would then cover all or part of the employee's wage during the 
training period. The employer would also pay for the direct cost of training. In principle, once 
the training, duly negotiated with the employer, was completed, the employee would receive 
some form of recognition for the new qualifications obtained through the training.  
This was a radically new approach, in that it involved a collective, group decision (to create 
the accounts) linked to a bilateral commitment between the individual and the employer. It 
called upon individual employees to make their own contribution, whilst obtaining further 
resources from the employers. It was a system for joint investment in training. 
Part of the discussions between unions and employers concerned the level of mutual 
commitment. At the end of the last session of negotiations, an equal commitment by both 
parties was agreed upon. However, this was to be ex post equality, since the employer only 
contributed to the account once the training plan negotiated with the employee had actually 
been completed. Another part of the discussions focused on the ability to transfer this account 
should the employee leave the company. It was agreed that the amount "paid in" by the 
employee could be transferred, either by transferring an account to a new company or by 
depositing it with a group fund. However, since by definition the employer's share is not 
transferable, the new employer may not necessarily feel obliged to sign an agreement on a 
career development plan.   
This system of individual accounts assumes that each employee is able and willing to 
provision their account. Generally, such systems are known to be quite successful with 
executives, the more qualified and the better paid, but they often prove less successful for the 
less trained and lower paid. Entitling employees to such a new system would probably 
exacerbate existing disparities. It was a part of the 2001 dispute, both between unions and 
employers, and between employer’s organisations (as it was expensive). 
The 2003 final result keeps the same purpose, but the device is rather different. Each 
individual get a yearly “theoretical” education and training right of 20 hours, which could be 
cumulated for 6 years. If an employee wants to use his right, he negotiates with his employer 
on the goals and the organisation of the training. The course must improve the skills and not 
only follow job adaptation. It must end with a diploma or a certificate. The firm will pay the 
training fees and other related expenditure (travel…).  The course may be attended outside or 
during the working time (or both). For the part, which is out the regular working time, the 
employee will get a lump sum of 50% of his net wage. And at the end of the course, the 
employer must take into account the new skills and competencies (change in the job content, 
upgrading…). 
This new track, which is added to the two existing before (the firm’s training plan and the 
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individual training leave) is redefining the borders between them. 
 
 
Table 4 
 
The Three Tracks To Vocational Training 
 
 
Firm 
Training Plan 
Individual Training 
Right  
Individual 
Training 
Leave 
Who 
Decide ? 
Employer 
 
Negotiated between 
The employer and 
The Individual 
The Individual 
Social 
Partners 
Advice of the 
Firm council 
Framework, with 
industry and firm 
collective agreement 
Bipartite Fund 
Training  
Time 
Paid by the employer 
During working time 
Out or (partly) during 
the normal working 
time 
Training leave 
Funded  
By 
The firm The firm: training 
fees and lump sum 
(50% of the net 
wage)  
The bipartite fund, 
Firm’s 
Compulsory 
contribution 
Goals Adaptation to the 
work place 
Vocational Evolution Id and Personal 
development 
 
    
    
All of these measures, which gave rise to the most debate during the negotiations, represented 
a break with the 1971 legislation by placing the individual at the heart of the system.  
 
II.2 Between continuity of the classical FVET system, risk and transitions.  
 
 
Examining the content of the 2001 and 2003 agreements, it looks more like an addition of 
various measures, some based on the previous FVET system (the compulsory levy), others 
more original. Using risk or welfare, and insurance or social right, we can situate the various 
components of the agreement, as shown below (see also Gautié, 2003, for a presentation of 
social policies opposing neo-liberal and socio-democrat using similar criteria).      
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II.2.1 An attempt to take into account individual trajectories.  
 
Analysing the project of 2001, some words are different from the 2003 agreement. The 
introduction put the emphasis on the individual’s initiative, as the “individual must face his 
skill obsolescence and develop his own occupational capacities”. The employee was said to 
be an actor and with a co-responsibility upon his professional evolution. One of the leaders 
representing the employer’s organisation spoke about the employee “building his own 
parachute in order to face the risk of unemployment” (see also Osterman, 1999 for a very 
similar sentence about neo-liberal policies). Most of these words and sentences are not present 
in the 2003 agreement, which seems to take more distance with the “risk” debate and comes 
back to a more classical notion of “rights” and welfare.    
 
These rights are clearly embedded in the concept of transitions, transitions within the firm 
(job evolution, moving from one job to another) and transitions out of the firm, which is also 
called a “professional project”. The new agreement is breaking with the previous FVET 
system, which was mainly focused on internal labour markets, and on “organisational careers” 
(career paths built more on the organisational structure than on the individual competencies) 
(Mehaut 1995). 
 
Risk 
Social 
Right Insurance 
Welfare 
Firm 
training 
Plan, Job 
adaptation 
 
Individual training right,  
Individual training leave 
Individual 
training account 
(2001 draft) 
Contract and 
period of 
professionnal 
development 
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But the break is partial: 
 
- The agreement, between employers and unions mainly present in big firms, still 
concerns the “earth” of the wage earner relationship: employees with fixed term 
contracts or under other atypical status get less rights. On the contrary of the 2001 
draft, the individual training right is not transferable between firms in the case of 
voluntary quitting (some industry-level agreements will probably organise the 
transferability, as it is presently discussed in the building industry). 
- As a paradox, the agreement is reinforcing the “French neo-corporatism”. The power 
and role of the industry-level organisations is reinforced in two ways. On the one 
hand, it is at this level that the priorities for the groups of employees who could enter 
the professional contracts and period will be decided as well as the priorities for the 
individual training right certificates. And these priorities will be compulsory for the 
employer and for the employee. On the other hand, the training group funds at the 
industry level, which collect and manage a part of the training funds (roughly 40%), 
are also reinforced: the increasing (more than doubling) mandatory training levy of 
SME’s and the smaller increase for the other firms will be collected and managed by 
these funds. 
- Last but not least, the social actors, during the negotiation have demanded that the 
State contributes to the ITR. The idea was to give to the lowest educated people (lower 
than the French baccalaureate) the equivalent of the cost of one year of full time 
education. This additional right would lengthen the ITR and enlarge the opportunities 
for the less skilled workers. The cost would be share by the state and the local 
authorities, and eventually with additional funding from the group funds. Today, 
despite a lot of positive public statements (from the right and left political side), there 
is no concrete answer. 
 
       
 
II.2.2 A step towards more individualisation 
 
In the previous system, the power of the firm was very high. The employer had a direct and 
full control over the firm’s training plan. Surveys showed that the individual’s initiative in the 
training choices was at a low level (Fournier 2001) 
 
The individual education and training right (ITR) brings a new space for the individual 
choice. The right of the employee is a personal one, a right over a resource for an individual 
choice, to be negotiated with the employer. Within the professional period, by way of the 
accreditation of prior learning experience and with the individual education passport, the 
emphasis is also put on the individual. 
 
These new rights do not take the form of individual accounts in money. They are 
« theoretical » rights over non-marketable resources, protected by collective rules. Their 
philosophical background is closer to the proposals of TLM theory (Gazier 2003) or of labour 
market status (Supiot, 1999) than to the proposals of the neo-liberal approach of risk and 
insurance. The difference between the 2001 draft, where the ITR took the form of an 
individual training account in money, is strong. Unions could be regarded as the winners of 
the negotiation on this topic. This could partly explain why the CGT signed the agreement, as 
this union is now claiming for a « social security » safety net for employment (Le Duigou, 
2004). But as in any negotiation, the employer side get on the one hand the reinforced 
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corporatism (which allows the employers bodies and collective organisation a more direct 
control on the flow of funds) and a new share of the costs between employers and employees. 
 
II.2.3 The share of the costs                    
  
In the French tradition coming from the 1970 and 1971 FVET framework, the costs of further 
education and training was mainly on the employer side. For the employees, FVET was 
mainly during the working time, with full wage, and the employer paid the full costs of the 
training course and other expenditures. For the unemployed, the training costs were paid by 
the State and unemployment insurance, and the unemployment benefits were paid during the 
training period. Using the 2000 training survey, Fournier (2001) showed that, for the 
employees, for 50% of the cases, the employer had the initiative of the training (for 25% it is 
a co-initiative and for 25% a self initiative of the employee). And for 87%, the employee did 
not support any direct cost. In more than 70% of the cases, the courses were fully within the 
working time.    
 
When implementing and negotiating the 35 Hours working time rules, some industries 
(especially the engineering and mechanical industry) made an attempt to transfer the training 
outside of the working time. They partly succeeded, and it was a matter of dispute within the 
employers’ side during the 2001 round of negotiation. These industries did not want any 
change to their specific agreements. And they contributed to the failure of this first round. 
However, at the same time, some labour law courts delivered judgement saying that the 
obligation of job adaptation, through education and training was an employer’s obligation and 
has to be free of charge for the employees (Gomez-Mustel, 2004). 
 
The new system keeps some of these rules. Job adaptation is a duty for the employer and must 
be included in the firm training plan (not in the ITR). As a part of the firm training plan, 
courses and other training period are during the working time, time is paid, and the employer 
pays for other costs. But the new system also introduces a (small) part of co-responsibility and 
of share of the costs. 
 
Within the firm’s training plan, when the courses are aiming to develop employees’ 
competencies, or for some training within the “professional period”, a part of the time could 
be out of the regular working time. It is clearer for the ITR: the general rule is out of the 
working time, even if latter negotiation could reintroduce part of the courses within the 
working time. It is a real change for the unions, which now agree with the fact that part of 
education and training time could not be regarded as “pure working time”. They also agree 
with the co-responsibility between employer and employee, as the ITR is a kind of bilateral 
contract with the individual giving time and eventually money.  
 
 Thus, a strange “grey time” appears (Favennec-Hery, 2004). The employee remains under 
employment contract, and keeps the various social protections (against industrial accident, 
social security). He is in an education and training course or period, out of the working time 
but in the framework of its individual contract with the employer. This time is not paid, but 
the employer will provide 50% of the wage…And the employee is not under the employer’s 
supervision. So we are partly outside of the employment contract and partly within it. The 
cost of this “grey time“, devoted to the competencies development, is shared between the 
employer and the employee (who gives time). It is very similar to the “transitional times” not 
clearly outside of the employment relation, not clearly within) and/or to the labour market 
status proposal  (which claim for social time and social rights devoted to social activities and 
 14
investment of the individuals, as an individual contribution to his self development, and to the 
development of the society).        
 
Conclusion 
 
 
It is too early to evaluate the impact of the new system. It built a new general framework, with 
a lot of procedural rather than substantive rules. 
 
Most of the concrete and precise conditions will be defined at the industry and firm level: it is 
the case for the more targeted groups to be defined at the industry level. And in some firms, 
the negotiation will probably extend the ITR right. 
 
But it is possible to draw some knowledge from this first step of the reform. 
 
a) Despite the initial ambitions, the new system is still focused mainly on the “classical wage 
earners”. Those with short-term contracts, those with low length of tenure will be out of some 
rights (for example, the ITR starts only after one year of tenure, and is not transferable: if you 
move from one firm to another every 2 or 3 years, you will never obtain a sufficient number 
of training hours). It was also planed, in the 2001 draft agreement to develop a network of 
bodies aiming to inform and give advice for the vocational and professional orientation of the 
individuals. This network must clearly cross the industry-level frontiers, and for the low skill 
jobs, must be built up at the local level. The 2003 agreement did not choose this solution, and 
most of the tasks will be performed by the industry training groups-funds. It is one of the 
limits of the French industrial relation system. Unions and employers organisations represent, 
for the former the classical wage earners and for the latter the big firms. They have difficulties 
to keep in mind other non-classical kinds of wage earning relationship. Within the employers’ 
organisations, the most powerful industry based organisations were the most critical about the 
“inter-industry” perspective, especially at the local level. And they were also firmly opposed 
to the individual training account, which could lead to a weakening of the industry based 
group funds. In the lifelong learning view, and also in the TLM one, this framework of social 
actors has strong limitations. Building lifelong rights (and/or insurance based solutions) needs 
a transversal point of view, out of the classical framework of industrial relation (Luttringer, 
2004). The weakness of the public (State) policy (for 20 years the State has been less and less 
active in the field of FVET, transferring the responsibilities to the regional authorities and/or 
to the social actors) is a key question for a deeper evolution of the system. It is more and more 
an obstacle, as a new framework of national co-ordination did not accompany the transfer of 
the power to regional authorities between the regions, the state and the social actors.          
  
b) Nevertheless, the merging of an individual right to training, even with hard limitations, and 
the necessity to negotiate at the firm level (both about the firm collective rules and about its 
use at an individual level) could lead to an important change for the unions. In the past, they 
put the emphasis on collective rules and rights, and did not take into account the individual 
own choices. They were unable to give advice and to help the individuals. The new system, as 
well as the new human resource management (see also Brochier, 2001 and Mehaut 2004 
about the competencies based management as a challenge for the unions), is a challenge for 
new practices. Some unions (mostly CFDT) have a clear view of this challenge and are 
working to develop new kinds of union’s activities. Starting from another point of view 
(individualisation of social rights and not “risk management”) they match the Abbot and 
Kelly point of view about the industrial relation in the risk society. 
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Table 1 Level of employment instability 1969-2002 
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